SECTION ONE
ON THE PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS

I

The will to truth, which will seduce us yet to many a risky venture,

that famous truthfulness about which all philosophers to date have
spoken with deference: what manner of questions has this will to
truth presented for us! What strange, wicked, questionable ques
tions! It is already a long story, and yet doesn’t it seem to be just
getting started? Is it any wonder that we finally grow suspicious,
lose patience, turn round impatiently? That rve learn from this
Sphinx how to pose questions of our own? Who is actually asking
us the questions here? What is it in us that really wants to ‘get at
the truth’?
It is true that we paused for a long time to question the origin
of this will, until finally we came to a complete stop at an even
more basic question. We asked about the value of this will. Given
that we want truth: why do we not prefer untruth? And uncertainty?
Even ignorance?
The problem of the value of truth appeared before us—or did
we appear before it? Which of us here is Oedipus? Which the
Sphinx? It is a rendezvous, so it seems, of questions and question
marks.
And would you believe that in the end it seems to us as if the
problem had never yet been posed, as if we were seeing it for
the first time, focusing on it, daring it? For there is daring to it,
and perhaps no daring greater.
2

‘How could something arise from its opposite? Truth from error,
for example? Or the will to truth from the will to deception? Or
altruism from egoism? Or the wise man’s pure, radiant contem
plation from covetous desire? Such origination is impossible;
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whoever dreams of it is a fool, or worse; those things of highest
value must have a different origin, their own; they cannot be derived
from this perishable, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this
confusion of desire and delusion! Rather, their basis must lie in the
womb of existence, in the imperishable, in the hidden god, in
the “thing in itself”*—and nowhere else!’
Judgements of this kind constitute the typical prejudice by which
we can always recognize the metaphysicians of every age; this kind
of value judgement is at the back of all their logical proceedings;
from out of this ‘belief’ of theirs, they go about seeking their
‘knowledge’, which they end by ceremoniously dubbing ‘the truth’.
The metaphysicians’ fundamental belief is the belief in the opposition
of values. It has never occurred even to the most cautious among
them to raise doubts here at the threshold, where doubts would be
most necessary, even though they have vowed to themselves: ‘‘de
omnibus dubitandum'.* For may there not be doubt, first of all,
whether opposites even exist and, second, whether those popular
value judgements and value oppositions upon which metaphysicians
have placed their seal may be no more than foreground evaluations,
temporary perspectives, viewed from out of a corner perhaps, or
up from underneath, a perspective from below* (to borrow an
expression common to painters)? However much value we may
ascribe to truth, truthfulness, or altruism, it may be that we need
to attribute a higher and more fundamental value to appearance, to
the will to illusion, to egoism and desire. It could even be possible
that the value of those good and honoured things consists precisely
in the fact that in an insidious way they are related to those bad,
seemingly opposite things, linked, knit together, even identical
perhaps. Perhaps!
But who is willing to worry about such dangerous Perhapses?
We must wait for a new category of philosophers to arrive, those
whose taste and inclination are the reverse of their predecessors’—
they will be in every sense philosophers of the dangerous Perhaps.
And to speak in all seriousness: I see these new philosophers
coming.

On the Prejudices of Philosophers

7

3
Having long kept a strict eye on the philosophers, and having
looked between their lines, I say to myself: the largest part of
conscious thinking has to be considered an instinctual activity, even
in the case of philosophical thinking; we need a new understanding
here, just as we’ve come to a new understanding of heredity and
the ‘innate’. Just as the act of birth is scarcely relevant to the entire
process and progress of heredity, so ‘consciousness’ is scarcely
opposite to the instincts in any decisive sense—most of a philo
sopher’s conscious thinking is secretly guided and channelled into
particular tracks by his instincts. Behind all logic, too, and its
apparent tyranny of movement there are value judgements, or to
speak more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a
particular kind of life. That a certainty is worth more than an
uncertainty, for example, or that appearance is worth less than
‘truth’: whatever their regulatory importance for us, such evalu
ations might still be nothing but foreground evaluations, a certain
kind of niaiserie,* as is required for the preservation of beings like
us. Given, that is, that man is not necessarily the ‘measure of all
things’*. . .

4
We do not object to a judgement just because it is false; this is
probably what is strangest about our new language. The question
is rather to what extent the judgement furthers life, preserves life,
preserves the species, perhaps even cultivates the species; and we
are in principle inclined to claim that judgements that are the most
false (among which are the synthetic a priori judgements)* are the
most indispensable to us, that man could not live without accepting
logical fictions, without measuring reality by the purely invented
world of the unconditional, self-referential, without a continual
falsification of the world by means of the number—that to give up
false judgements would be to give up life, to deny life. Admitting
untruth as a condition of life: that means to resist familiar values
in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that dares this has already
placed itself beyond good and evil.
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5
What provokes us to look at all philosophers with a mixture of
distrust and contempt is not that we are always uncovering how
guileless they are—how often and easily they lose their grasp or
their way, in short how childish and childlike they are. It is rather
that they are not honest enough, however loud and virtuous a
racket they all make as soon as the problem of truthfulness is
touched upon, even from afar. For they act as if they had discovered
and acquired what are actually their opinions through the indepen
dent unravelling of a cold, pure, divinely unhampered dialectic
(whereas mystics of every order, who are more honest, and more
foolish, speak of ‘inspiration’); basically, however, they are using
reasons sought after the fact to defend a pre-existing tenet, a sudden
idea, a ‘brainstorm’, or, in most cases, a rarefied and abstract version
of their heart’s desire. They are all of them advocates who refuse
the name, that is in most cases wily spokesmen for their prejudices,
which they dub ‘truths’; and they are very far from having a
conscience brave enough to own up to it, very far from having the
good taste to announce it bravely, whether to warn a foe or a friend,
or simply from high spirits and self-mockery. We have to smile at
the spectacle of old Kant’s hypocrisy,* as rigid as it is chaste, as he
lures us onto the dialectical backroads that lead (or better, mislead)
us to his ‘categorical imperative’,* for we are fastidious and take
no small amusement in monitoring the subtle wiles of old moralists
and moral preachers. Or take that hocus-pocus of mathematical
form in which Spinoza armoured and disguised his philosophy
(‘the love of his wisdom’* ultimately, if we interpret the word
correctly and fairly), to intimidate at the outset any brave assailant
who might dare to throw a glance at this invincible virgin and
Pallas Athena—how this sickly hermit’s masquerade betrays his
own timidity and assailability!

6
Little by little I came to understand what every great philosophy
to date has been: the personal confession of its author, a kind of
unintended and unwitting memoir; and similarly, that the moral
(or immoral) aims in every philosophy constituted the actual seed
from which the whole plant invariably grew. Whenever explaining
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how a philosopher’s most far-fetched metaphysical propositions
have come about, in fact, one always does well (and wisely) to ask
first: ‘What morality is it (is he) aiming at?’ Thus I do not believe
that an ‘instinct for knowledge’ is the father of philosophy, but
rather that here as elsewhere a different instinct has merely made
use of knowledge (and kNOwledge!)* as its tool. For anyone who
scrutinizes the basic human instincts to determine how influential
they have been as inspiring spirits (or demons and goblins) will find
that all the instincts have practised philosophy, and that each one
of them would like only too well to represent itself as the ultimate
aim of existence and as the legitimate master of all other instincts.
For every instinct is tyrannical; and as such seeks to philosophize.
Admittedly, things may be different (‘better’, if you like) with
scholars, the truly scientific people; they may really have something
like an instinct for knowledge, some small independent clockwork
which, when properly wound up, works away bravely without neces
sarily involving all the scholar’s other instincts. That is why a
scholar’s real ‘interests’ generally lie elsewhere entirely, in his family,
say, or in the acquisition of wealth, or in politics; indeed it is almost
a matter of indifference whether his little machine is located in this
branch of science or that, or whether the ‘promising’ young worker
turns out to be a good philologist or a mushroom expert or a
chemist: what he eventually becomes does not distinguish him
About the philosopher, conversely, there is absolutely nothing that
is impersonal; and it is above all his morality which proves decidedly
and decisively who he is—that is, in what hierarchy the innermost
drives of his nature are arranged.

7
How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more ven
omous than the joke that Epicurus* made at the expense of Plato
and the Platonists: he called them ‘Dionysiokolakes’. Literally and
primarily, this means ‘flatterers of Dionysus’, that is, the tyrant’s
appendages and toadies; but it also suggests: ‘They are all actors,
there is nothing genuine about them’ (for ‘Dionysiokolax’ was a
popular term for an actor). And the latter meaning contains the
real malice that Epicurus fired off at Plato: he was annoyed by
the mannered grandiosity, the theatricality that Plato and his pupils
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deployed so well, and that Epicurus did not! Epicurus, the old
schoolmaster of Samos, sat tucked away in his little garden in
Athens and wrote three hundred books—out of fury and ambition
against Plato—who knows?
It took one hundred years for Greece to realize who this gardengod Epicurus had been.
Did it realize?

8
In every philosophy there is a point when the philosopher’s ‘convic
tion’ makes its entrance; or, in the language of an old mystery play:
adventavit asinus
pulcher et fortissimus.*

9
You want to live ‘according to nature’? Oh you noble Stoics,* what
deceit lies in these words! Imagine a creature constituted like nature,
prodigal beyond measure, neutral beyond measure, with no purpose
or conscience, with no compassion or fairness, fertile and desolate
and uncertain all at once; imagine Indifference itself as a power:
how could you live according to this indifference? To live—isn’t
that precisely the desire to be other than this nature? Doesn’t life
mean weighing, preferring, being unjust, having limits, wanting to
be Different? And even if the real meaning of your imperative
‘to live according to nature’ is ‘to live according to life’—how could
you do otherwise} Why make a principle out of something that you
already are and needs must be?
The truth is something else entirely: while you pretend to delight
in reading the canon of your law from nature, you want the opposite,
you curious play-actors and self-deceivers! In your pride you want
to dictate your morality, your ideals to nature, incorporate them
into nature, of all things; you demand that nature be ‘according to
Stoics’; you would like to make all existence exist in accordance with
your own image alone—for the great and unending glorification and
universalization of Stoicism! With all your love of truth, you force
yourselves to stare so long, so constantly, so hypnotically at nature
that you see it falsely, that is, stoically, and you become incapable
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of seeing it otherwise. And then out of some unfathomable arro
gance you conceive the lunatic hope that because you know how to
tyrannize yourself (Stoicism is self-tyranny), nature too can be tyr
annized: for isn’t the Stoic a part of nature?. . .
But this is an old, eternal story: what took place back then with
the Stoics is still taking place today, whenever a philosophy begins
to believe in itself It always creates the world according to its own
image, it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive
itself, the most spiritual form of the will to power, to ‘creation of
the world’, to the causa prima*
10

The zeal and subtlety (I would almost like to say ‘cunning’) with
which everyone in Europe today is raising the question ‘of the real
and the apparent world’ give us cause for thought and for list
ening—and anyone who hears only a ‘will to truth’ in the
background certainly does not have the sharpest ears. In a few rare,
isolated cases a will to truth really may have played a part, an
extravagant or adventurous mood, a metaphysician’s craving for the
lost cause, a will that ultimately prefers a handful of ‘certainty’ to
a whole wagonload of beautiful possibilities; there may even be
some puritanical fanatics of conscience* who would rather lay down
their lives for a certain Nothing than for an uncertain Something.
But however valiant the gestures of such virtue, this is nihilism,
the sign of a despairing, mortally weary soul. With stronger, more
vital thinkers, still thirsty for life, things are different: they take
sides against appearance and are already pronouncing the word
‘perspectivist’ with arrogance; they take the credibility of their own
body about as seriously as the credibility of the appearance that
‘the earth stands still’. They seem to be ready cheerfully to let
drop from their hands their surest possession (for what do we
believe in more surely than our bodies?) and who knows whether
at bottom they might not want to regain something that they once
possessed even more surely, something from the old homestead of
belief of earlier times, the ‘immortal soul’ perhaps, or ‘the old
god’—ideas, in short, that led to a life that was better, more robust
and serene, than the one our ‘modern ideas’ can lead to? In this
question, there is mistrust of modern ideas, disbelief in everything
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constructed yesterday and today; there may be a slight element of
disgust and contempt, from those no longer able to tolerate the
highly eclectic conceptual bric-a-brac that today’s so-called posi
tivism brings to the market place; those with more fastidious taste
are revolted by the fairground motley and frippery of all these
reality-philosophists, who have nothing new or genuine apart from
their motley. We should credit the sceptical anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of today with at least this much, I think: we
have seen nothing to refute their instinct to escape from modern
reality—their retrograde backroads are no concern of ours! What
is important about them is not that they want to go ‘back’, but that
they want to go—away\ With a little more strength, more buoyancy,
courage, artistry, they would want to go beyond—and not back!
II

People today are trying, it seems to me, to divert attention from
Kant’s real influence on German philosophy, trying especially to
evade what he himself considered his great value. Kant was most
proud of his table of categories; holding it in his hands he said,
‘This is the most difficult thing that ever could be undertaken for
the benefit of metaphysics.’
But let us understand what this ‘could be’ really implies! He was
proud of having discovered in man a new faculty, the faculty to
make synthetic a priori judgements. Granted that he was deceiving
himself about his discovery: nevertheless, the development and
rapid flowering of German philosophy stem from this pride
and from the rivalry of his disciples to discover if at all possible
something worthy of even more pride—and in any event ‘new
faculties’!
But let’s think about it, it is high time. ‘How are syilthetic a
priori judgements possible}' wondered Kant, and what did he
answer? They are facilitated by a faculty:* unfortunately, however,
he did not say this in four words, but so cumbersomely, so venerably,
and with such an expense of German profundity and omateness
that people misheard the comical niaiserie allemande* in such an
answer. They were ecstatic about this new faculty, in fact, and the
rejoicing reached its height when Kant discovered a moral faculty
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in man as well. (For at that time Germans were still moral, and
not yet ‘real-political’.*)
There followed the honeymoon of German philosophy; all the
young theologians of the Tubingen Stiff* headed right for the
bushes—they were all looking for ‘faculties’. And what all didn’t
they find, in that innocent, rich, still youthful era of the German
spirit when the malicious elf Romanticism was still piping and
singing, back when no one yet had learned to distinguish between
‘finding’ and ‘inventing’!* They found above all a faculty for the
‘extra-sensual’: Schelling christened it ‘intellectual intuition’,* thus
meeting the dearest desires of his essentially pious-desirous
Germans. One can do no greater injustice to this whole arrogant,
enthusiastic movement (which was youth itself, however audaciously
it may have cloaked itself in grey, senile concepts) than to take it
seriously and treat it with anything like moral indignation. Enough,
people grew older—the dream vanished. The time came for them
to rub their foreheads: they are rubbing them still today. They had
been dreaming, and the first among them had been old Kant.
‘Facilitated by a faculty’—that’s what he had said, or at least that’s
what he had meant. But what kind of an answer is that? What kind
of explanation? Isn’t it rather simply repeating the question? How
can opium make us sleep? It is ‘facilitated by a faculty’, the virtus
dormitiva, answers that doctor in Moliere,
quia est in eo virtus dormitiva
cujus est natura sensus assoupire.*
But answers like these belong in comedy, and for the Kantian
question ‘How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?’ it is
high time to substitute another question: ‘Why is the belief in
such judgements necessary}'—it is time to understand that for the
purpose of preserving treatures of our kind, we must believe that
such judgements are true; \Vhich means, of course, that they could
still be false judgements. Or to put it more clearly, and crudely and
completely: synthetic a priori judgements should not ‘be possible’
at all; we have no right to them, in our mouths they are only false
judgements. Yet the belief in their truth happens to be necessary
as one of the foreground beliefs and appearances that constitute
the perspective-optics of life.
And, finally, remembering the enormous effect that ‘German

14

Beyond Good and Evil

philosophy’ exercised throughout Europe (one understands, I hope,
why it deserves quotation marks?), let no one doubt that a certain
virtus dormitiva had a part in it: amidst the noble men of leisure,
the moralists, mystics, artists, the partial Christians, and political
obscurantists of every nation, people were delighted that German
philosophy offered an antidote to the still overpowering sensualism
pouring into this century from the previous one, in short: ‘sensus
assoupire’. . .
12

As regards materialistic atomism,* hardly anything has ever been
so well refuted; in all Europe there is probably no scholar so
unschooled as to want to credit it with serious meaning, apart from
a handy everyday usefulness (that is, as a stylistic abbreviation).
This we owe primarily to the Pole Boscovich,* who along with the
Pole Copernicus* achieved the greatest victory yet in opposing
the appearance of things. For while Copernicus convinced us to
believe contrary to all our senses that the earth does not stand still,
Boscovich taught us to renounce the last thing that ‘still stood’
about the earth, the belief in ‘substance’, in ‘matter’, in the bit of
earth, the particle, the atom: no one on earth has ever won a greater
triumph over the senses.
However, we must go even further and declare war, a merciless
war unto the death against the ‘atomistic need’ that continues to
live a dangerous afterlife in places where no one suspects it (as
does the more famous ‘metaphysical need’).* The first step must
be to kill off that other and more ominous atomism that Christianity
taught best and longest: the atomism of the soul. If you allow me, I
would use this phrase to describe the belief that holds the soul to
be something ineradicable, eternal, indivisible, a monad, an atom:
science must cast out this belief! And confidentially, we do not need
to get rid of ‘the soul’ itself nor do without one of our oldest, most
venerable hypotheses, which the bungling naturalists tend to do,
losing ‘the soul’ as soon as they’ve touched on it. But the way is
clear for new and refined versions of the hypothesis about the soul;
in future, concepts such as the ‘mortal soul’ and the ‘soul as the
multiplicity of the subject’ and the ‘soul as the social construct of
drives and emotions’ will claim their rightful place in science. By
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putting an end to the superstitions that proliferated with nearly
tropical abundance around the idea of the soul, the new psychologist
has of course seemed to cast himself into a new desolation and a
new distrust—it may be that the old psychologists had it easier,
merrier—but he knows that he is thereby also condemned to
inventing, and—who knows?—perhaps to finding.—
13

Physiologists should think twice before deciding that an organic
being’s primary instinct is the instinct for self-preservation. A living
being wants above all else to release its strength; life itself is the
will to power, and self-preservation is only one of its indirect and
most frequent consequences.
Here as everywhere, in short, we must beware of superfiuous teleo
logical principles! And this is what the instinct for self-preservation
is (which we owe to the inconsistency of Spinoza).* Such are
the dictates of our method, which in essence demands that we be
frugal with our principles.
14

It now may be dawning on five or six thinkers that even physics is
only a way of interpreting or arranging the world (if I may say so:
according to us!) and not a way of explaining the world. But in so
far as it relies on our belief in the senses, physics is taken for more
than that, and shall long continue to be taken for more, for an
explanation. Our eyes and fingers speak for it, appearance and
palpability speak for it: to an era with essentially plebeian tastes
this is enchanting, persuasive, convincing, for it instinctively follows
the canonized truth of ever-popular sensualism. What is clear, what
‘clarifies’? First, whatever can be seen and touched—you have to
take every problem at least that far. Conversely, the magic of the
Platonic method consisted precisely in its resistance to sensuality,
for this was an aristocratic method, practised by people who may
have enjoyed senses even stronger and more clamorous than those
of our contemporaries, but who sought a higher triumph by mas
tering them, by tossing over this colourful confusion of the senses
(the rabble of the senses, as Plato called it) the pale, cold, grey nets
of concepts. There was a kind of enjoyment in Plato’s manner of
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overpowering and interpreting the world different from the one
currently offered us by physicists, including those Darwinists and
anti-teleologists among the physiological workers with their prin
ciple of the ‘least possible energy’* and the greatest possible
stupidity. ‘Where man has nothing more to see and grasp, he has
nothing more to seek’—that imperative certainly differs from
Plato’s, but it may be exactly right for a hardy, industrious future
race of machinists and bridge-builders who have only dirty work
to do.
15

In order to practise physiology with a good conscience, you have to
believe that the sense organs are not phenomena in the philosophical
idealist sense, for then they could not be causes! This is sensualism
as a regulative hypothesis at least, if not as an heuristic principle.
What’s that.? And other people are actually saying that the
external world is created by our sense organs? But then our body,
as part of this external world, would be the creation of our sense
organs! But then our very sense organs would be—the creation of
our sense organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio
ad absurdum:* assuming that the concept causa sui* is something
completely absurd. It follows that the outer world is not the creation
of our sense organs—?

16
There are still some harmless self-scrutinizers who think that there
are ‘immediate certainties’, as for example, ‘I think’, or, in Schopen
hauer’s superstition,* ‘I will’—as if perception could grasp its
object purely and nakedly as the ‘thing in itself’ without any
falsification on the part of the subject or of the object. But I shall
repeat a hundred times over that the ‘immediate certainty’, like
‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing in itself’, contains a contradictio
in adjecto:* it’s time people freed themselves from the seduction of
words! Let the common people think that perception means
knowing-to-the-end,* the philosopher must say to himself, ‘If I
analyse the process expressed by the proposition “I think”, I get a
series of audacious assertions that would be difficult if not impos
sible to prove; for example, that I am the one who is thinking, that
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there has to be a something doing the thinking, that thinking is an
activity and an effect on the part of a being who is thought of as
a cause, that an “I” exists, and finally, that we by now understand
clearly what is designated as thinking—that I know what thinking
is. For if I had not already decided it for myself, how could I
determine that what is going on is not “willing” or “feeling”.? In
short, saying “I think” assumes that I am comparing my present
state with other states that I experience in myself, thereby estab
lishing what it is: because of this reference back to another
“knowledge”, there is, for me at least, no immediate “certainty”
here.’
Thus, instead of that ‘immediate certainty’ that the common
people may believe in, the philosopher gets handed a series of
metaphysical questions: these are actually the intellect’s questions
of conscience, such as, ‘Where does my concept of thinking come
from? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the
right to talk about an “I”, and beyond that an “I as cause”, and
beyond that yet an “I as the cause of thoughts”?’ Anyone who dares
to answer such metaphysical questions promptly by referring to a
kind of epistemological intuition (like someone who says, ‘I think,
and know that this at least is true, real, and certain’) will be met
with a smile and two question marks by the philosopher of today.
‘My dear sir,’ the philosopher may suggest, ‘it is improbable that
you are not in error, but then why must we insist on truth?’
17

As regards the superstition of logicians, I never tire of underlining
a quick little fact that these superstitious people are reluctant to
admit: namely, that a thought comes when ‘it’ wants to, and not
when ‘I’ want it to; so it is falsifying the facts to say that the subject
‘I’ is the condition of the predicate ‘think’. There is thinking,* but
to assert that ‘there’ is the same thing as that famous old ‘I’ is, to
put it mildly, only an assumption, an hypothesis, and certainly not
an ‘immediate certainty’. And in the end ‘there is thinking’ is also
going too far: even this ‘there’ contains an interpretation of the
process and is not part of the process itself People are concluding
here according to grammatical habit: ‘Thinking is an activity; for
each activity there is someone who acts; therefore—.’ Following
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approximately the same pattern, ancient atomism looked for that
particle of matter, the atom, to complement the effective ‘energy’
that works from out of it; more rigorous minds finally learned to
do without this ‘little bit of earth’ and perhaps some day logicians
will even get used to doing without that little ‘there’ (into which
the honest old ‘F has evaporated).
18
Truly, a theory is charming not least because it is refutable: that is
Just what attracts the better minds to it. It would seem that the
theory of ‘free will’, which has been refuted a hundred times over,
owes its endurance to this charm alone—someone is always coming
along and feeling strong enough to refute it.
19

Philosophers tend to speak about the will as if everyone in the
world knew all about it; Schopenhauer even suggested that the will
was the only thing we actually do know, know through and through,
know without additions or subtractions. But I continue to think
that even in this case Schopenhauer was only doing what philo
sophers simply tend to do: appropriating and exaggerating a common
prejudice. As I see it, the act of willing is above all something
complicated, something that has unity only as a word—and this
common prejudice of using only one word has overridden the
philosophers’ caution (which was never all that great anyway). So
let us be more cautious for once, let us be ‘unphilosophical’. Let
us say that in every act of willing there is first of all a multiplicity
of feelings, namely the feeling of the condition we are moving away
from and the feeling of the condition we are moving towards-, the
feeling of this ‘away’ and this ‘towards’; and then a concomitant
feeling in the muscles that, without our actually moving ‘arms and
legs’, comes into play out of a kind of habit, whenever we ‘will’.
Second, just as we must recognize feeling, and indeed many kinds
of feeling, as an ingredient of the will, so must we likewise recognize
thinking: in every act of will there is a commanding thought, and
we must not deceive ourselves that this thought can be separated
off from ‘willing’, as if we would then have any will left over!
Third, the will is not merely a complex of feelings and thoughts.
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it is above all an emotion, and in fact the emotion of command.
What is called ‘freedom of the will’ is essentially the emotion of
superiority felt towards the one who must obey: ‘I am free, “he”
must obey.’ This consciousness lies in every will, as does also a
tense alertness, a direct gaze concentrated on one thing alone, an
unconditional assessment that ‘now we must have this and nothing
else’, an inner certainty that obedience will follow, and everything
else that goes along with the condition of giving commands. A
person who wills: this person is commanding a Something in
himself that obeys, or that he thinks is obeying.
But let us now consider the strangest thing about the will, about
this multifarious thing that the common people call by one word
alone. In any given case, we both command and obey, and when
we obey we know the feelings of coercion, pressure, oppression,
resistance, and agitation that begin immediately after the act of
will. On the other hand, we are in the habit of ignoring or over
looking this division by means of the synthetic concept ‘P. Thus,
a whole series of erroneous conclusions and therefore of false
assessments of the will itself has been appended to willing in such
a way that the person who wills now believes with complete faith
that willing is enough for action. Because in the vast majority of
cases, willing has only occurred when there is also the expectation
that the effect of the command—that is obedience, action—will
follow, this impression has been translated into the feeling that there
is a necessary effect; suffice it to say, the person willing thinks with
some degree of certainty that will and action are somehow one: he
attributes his success in carrying out his willing to the will itself
and in this way enjoys an increase in that feeling of power that
accompanies any kind of success. ‘Freedom of the will’—that is
the word for that complex pleasurable condition experienced by the
person willing who commands and simultaneously identifies himself
with the one who executes the command—as such he can share in
enjoying a triumph over resistance, while secretly judging that it
was actually his will that overcame that resistance. Thus the person
willing adds to his pleasurable feeling as commander the pleasurable
feelings of the successful executing instrument, the serviceable
‘underwiir or under-soul (our body after all is nothing but a social
structure of many souls). L’ejfet c’est moi:* what is occurring here
occurs in every well-structured happy community where the ruling
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class identifies with the successes of the community as a whole. As
we have said, every act of willing is simply a matter of commanding
and obeying, based on a social structure of many ‘souls’; for this
reason a philosopher should claim the right to comprehend willing
from within the sphere of ethics: ethics, that is, understood as the
theory of hierarchical relationships among which the phenomenon
‘life’ has its origins.
20

That individual philosophical concepts are not something isolated,
something unto themselves, but rather grow up in reference and
relatedness to one another; that however suddenly and arbitrarily
they seem to emerge in the history of thought, they are as much a
part of one system as are the branches of fauna on one continent:
this is revealed not least by the way the most disparate philosophers
invariably fill out one particular basic schema of possible philo
sophies. Under some unseen spell they always run around the same
orbit: however independent they may feel, one from the other, with
their will to criticism or to system, something in them is leading
them, driving them all to follow one another in a certain order—
an inborn taxonomy and affinity of concepts. In truth their thinking
is much less an act of discovery than an act of recognizing anew,
remembering anew, a return back home to a distant, ancient uni
versal economy of the soul from out of which those concepts
initially grew: philosophizing is thus a kind of atavism of the highest
order. This easily explains the strange family resemblance of all
Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing. Wherever linguistic
affinity, above all, is present, everything necessary for an analogous
development and sequence of philosophical systems will inevitably
be on hand from the beginning, thanks to the shared philosophy
of grammar (I mean thanks to being unconsciously ruled and
guided by similar grammatical functions), just as the way to certain
other possibilities for interpreting the world will seem to be blocked.
Philosophers from the Ural-Altaic linguistic zone (where the
concept of the subject is least developed) will most probably look
differently ‘into the world’ and will be found on other paths than
Indo-Germans or Muslims: and in the last analysis, the spell of

On the Prejudices of Philosophers

21

certain grammatical functions is the spell of physiological value
judgements arid conditions of race.
This by way of a rejection of Locke’s superficiality’’' concerning
the origin of ideas.
21

The causa sui* is the best internal contradiction ever devised, a
kind of logical freak or outrage: but because of man’s excessive
pride we have come to be deeply and terribly entangled with this
particular nonsense. The yearning for ‘freedom of the will’ in the
superlative metaphysical sense that unfortunately still prevails in
the minds of the half-educated, the yearning to bear complete and
final responsibility for one’s own actions and to relieve God, the
world, one’s ancestors, coincidence, society from it—this is really
nothing less than being that same causa sui and, with a daring
greater than Munchhausen’s,”' dragging yourself by your hair out
of the swamp of nothingness and into existence. Now, if someone
can see through the cloddish simplicity of this famous concept ‘free
will’ and eliminate it from his mind, I would then ask him to take
his ‘enlightenment’ a step further and likewise eliminate from his
head the opposite of the non-concept ‘free will’: I mean the ‘unfree
will’ which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. One should
not make the mistake of concretizing ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ as do
the natural scientists (and whoever else today naturalizes in their
thinking . . .), in conformity with the prevalent mechanistic foolish
ness that pushes and tugs at the cause until it ‘has an effect’; ‘cause’
and ‘effect’ should be used only as pure concepts, as conventional
fictions for the purpose of description or communication, and
not for explanation. In the ‘in itself’ there is nothing of ‘causal
associations’, of ‘necessity’, of ‘psychological constraint’; the effect
does not follow ‘upon the cause’, no ‘law’ governs it. We alone are
the ones who have invented causes, succession, reciprocity, rela
tivity, coercion, number, law, freedom, reason, purpose; and if we
project, if we mix this world of signs into things as if it were an
‘in itself’, we act once more as we have always done, that is,
mythologically. The ‘unfree will’ is mythology: in real life it is only
a matter of strong and weak wills.
Whenever a thinker sniffs out coercion, necessity, obligation.
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pressure, constraint in any ‘causal connection’ or ‘psychological
necessity’, it is almost always a symptom of where his own inad
equacy lies: to feel this particular way is revealing—the person is
revealing himself And if I have observed correctly, the ‘constraint
of the will’ is always conceived as a problem from two completely
opposite standpoints, but always in a profoundly personal way: the
one group will not hear of relinquishing their ‘responsibility’, their
belief in themselves, their personal right to take their credit (the vain
races are of this type); conversely, the other group wants to be
responsible for nothing, guilty of nothing, and out of their inner
self-contempt they yearn to cast off their own selves one way or
another. When this latter group writes books nowadays, they tend
to take up the cause of criminals; a sort of socialistic compassion
is their nicest disguise. And indeed, it is surprising how much
prettier the fatalism of the weak-willed can look when it presents
itself as ‘la religion de la souffrance humaine’;* that is what it
means by ‘good taste’.
22

If you’ll forgive me, an old philologist who can’t give up the
wickedness of pointing out examples of bad interpretative practice,
the ‘lawfulness of nature’ that you physicists speak about so proudly,
as if. . .—this only exists by grace of your interpretations, your
bad ‘philology’; it is not a factual matter, not a ‘text’, but rather no
more than a naive humanitarian concoction, a contortion of
meaning that allows you to succeed in accommodating the demo
cratic instincts of the modern soul! ‘Equality before the law is
everywhere—nature is no different and no better than we are’—
this amiable ulterior thought once again masks the plebeian’s enmity
towards everything privileged and autocratic, as well as a new and
more subtle atheism. ‘Ni dieu, ni maitre’*—that’s what you folks
want, too. So, ‘long live the law of nature!’ Isn’t that right.? But as
I say, this is interpretation, not text; and someone could come along
with the opposite intention and interpretative skill who, looking at
the very same nature and referring to the very same phenomena,
would read out of it the ruthlessly tyrannical and unrelenting
assertion of power claims. Such an interpreter would put to you
the universality and unconditionality in all ‘will to power’ in such

On the Prejudices of Philosophers

23

a way that virtually every word, even the word ‘tryanny’, would
ultimately appear useless or at least only as a modifying, mitigating
metaphor—as too human. Yet this philosopher, too, would end by
making the same claims for his world as you others do for yours,
namely that its course is ‘necessary’ and ‘predictable’, not because
laws are at work in it, but rather because the laws are absolutely
lacking, and in every moment every power draws its final conse
quence. And given that he too is just interpreting—and you’ll be
eager to raise that objection, won’t you?—then, all the better.
23

Until now, all psychology has been brought to a stop by moral
prejudices and fears: it has not dared to plumb these depths. If we
may take previous writing as a symptom of what has also been
suppressed, then no one in his thoughts has even brushed these
depths as I have, as a morphology and evolutionary theory of the
will to power. The force of moral prejudices has reached far into
the most spiritual world, a world apparently cold and without
premiss—and it has obviously had a harmful, inhibiting, blinding,
distorting effect. A real physio-psychology must struggle with the
unconscious resistances in the heart of the researcher, the ‘heart’
is working against it; a conscience that is still strong and hearty
will be distressed and annoyed even by a theory of the reciprocal
conditionality of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ instincts, which seems to be a
kind of subtle immorality—and even more by a theory of the
derivation of all good drives from bad ones. But granted that a
person takes the emotions of hatred, envy, greed, power hunger as
conditions for living, crucial and fundamental to the universal
economy of life and therefore in need of intensifying if life is to be
intensified, he is also a person who suffers from such an orientation
in judgement as if he were seasick. And yet even this hypothesis is
by no means the strangest or most painful one in this enormous,
virtually new realm of dangerous insights—and in truth there are
a hundred good reasons for everyone to stay away from it if he—
can\ On the other hand, once your ship has strayed onto this course:
well then! All right! Grit your teeth bravely! Open your eyes! Keep
your hand at the helm!—we are going to be travelling beyond
morality, and by daring to travel there we may in the process stifle
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or crush whatever remnant of morality we have left—but what do
we matter! Never yet has ?i deeper world of insight been opened to
bold travellers and adventurers; and the psychologist who makes
this kind of ‘sacrifice’ (it is not the sacrifizio dell’intelletto,* quite
the contrary!) may demand at least that psychology be recognized
once again as the queen of the sciences, which the other sciences
exist to serve and anticipate. For psychology has once again become
the way to basic issues.

